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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor of 
plaintiff/respondent Bette Wycalis (hereinafter "Wycalis") as 
against defendants/appellants Krantz and Christenson 
(hereinafter Krantz and Christenson). Wycalis' complaint 
alleged several causes of action including that against Krantz 
and Christenson as makers of a promissory note which was in 
default. (R. 1*6.) Three of the makers of the note, Randy 
Krantz, B. Brad Christenson and Debra Christenson denied 
liability on the note. (R. 4CU42.) Nonjury trial was held on 
September 26, 1985. At trial the facts of the case were 
presented by stipulation of the parties, which stipulation was 
read into the record. (R. 490*504.) Exhibits 1 * 7 were 
offered and received into evidence. (R. 498.) The matter was 
submitted to the court on simultaneous memoranda and reply 
memoranda. On January 21, 1986, the court entered its 
memorandum decision holding that Krantz and Christenson were 
liable to Wycalis on the promissory note. (R. 537*541.) 
Judgment was entered against Krantz and Christenson on February 
14, 1986, and they appeal seeking a reversal of that judgment. 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Wycalis filed her complaint in the Second Judicial District 
Court of Weber County on May 7, 1984. Initially, Wycalis named 
fifteen defendants. Of those fifteen defendants, only thirteen 
were served with process. The two defendants that were not 
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served with process were Ed Maas and Sharon Miles. 
Of the remaining thirteen defendants, five were dismissed 
pursuant to stipulation after initial discovery had been 
completed. Those defendants were Gary h. Meredith, Lyle G. 
Meredith, City Consumer Services, U.S. Title and City Federal 
Savings. 
Defendant R. M. Wall responded to Wycalis1 complaint by 
filing a disclaimer as to Count V of Wycalis' complaint (quiet 
title). 
Defendants Roy L. Miller and R & C Associates were served 
with process, but did not answer and have been dismissed 
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Summary judgment was entered against Wycalis with respect 
to her claims against defendants Guardian Title and Warren H. 
Curlis, its President. 
Judgment was entered against the remaining three 
defendants, Randy Krantz, B. Brad Christenson, and Debra 
Christenson in favor of Wycalis on February 14, 1986. These 
defendants have appealed that judgment, which is the subject 
matter of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about July 1, 1980, defendant R & C Associates (R 
& C) by and through Roy L. Miller, general partner, and Randy 
Krantz, B. Brad Christenson and Debra S. Christenson executed 
an installment promissory note payable to Bette Wycalis and her 
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mother, Eva Robertson, in the amount of $61,800.00. (R. 493, 
plaintiff's exhibit #1.) 
2. On or about June 26, 1980, defendant R & C, as trustor, 
by and through Roy L. Miller, general partner, executed, as 
security for payment of the July 1, 1980, promissory note, a 
second trust deed. Guardian Title Company was the trustee and 
Bette Wycalis and Eva Robertson were beneficiaries on the trust 
deed. (R. 493, plaintiff's exhibit 2.) 
3. Mrs. Robertson has assigned her interest in the trust 
deed note and trust deed to respondent Wycalis. The amount 
owed on the deed of trust and unpaid is the sum of $53,660.44, 
principal with interest at the rate of 10.5%. (R. 493.) 
4. The trust deed of June 26, 1980, described property 
located in Weber County, State of Utah. (plaintiff's exhibit 
2.) 
5. Sometime prior to December 26, 1980, Guardian Title 
received a forged, although acknowledged, request for 
reconveyance. That reconveyance purported to bear the 
signatures of Mrs. Robertson and Wycalis. However, the 
signatures on the request for reconveyance are not the 
signatures of Mrs. Robertson or Wycalis. There is no evidence 
that defendants Krantz or Christenson were involved in 
obtaining the request, or in delivering the request to 
Guardian, nor did they have any knowledge of its preparation of 
its delivery. (R. 493 * 494, plaintiff's exhibit 3.) 
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6. On December 26, 1980, Guardian executed and recorded a 
deed of reconveyance, thus divesting Wycalis of her security 
interest* (R. 494, plaintiff's exhibit 4.) 
7. A portion of the property which was reconveyed was 
again encumbered in favor of Wycalis and Robertson by another 
trust deed on December 29, 1980. (R. 494, plaintiff's exhibit 
5.) 
8. On or about April 4, 1981, Guardian received another 
request for reconveyance, again purportedly executed by 
Wycalis and Robertson, These signatures are also not the 
signatures of Wycalis and Robertson. (R. 494, plaintiff's 
exhibit 6.) 
9. Guardian executed a deed of reconveyance with respect 
to the December 29, 1980, trust deed on April 4, 1981. This 
deed of reconveyance was recorded by Guardian on July 6, 1981. 
(R. 494 * 495, plaintiff's exhibit 7.) 
10. The fair market value of the property described in the 
July 26, 1980, trust deed, which secured the promissory note, 
would have been more than sufficient to have satisfied tne note 
held by Wycalis. (R. 495.) 
11. Neither Christenson nor Krantz had any interest in the 
equity of the property conveyed as security for the promissory 
note. Krantz and Christenson paid a consideration in the 
amount of $2,000 for the use of the security. (R. 495, 497 4 
498.) 
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12. Had the security for the note not been reconveyed by 
Guardian, Wycalis would have looked solely to the security for 
the satisfaction of the debt owed to her by the makers of the 
note. (R. 495.) 
13. The note and deed of trust were prepared by Guardian 
Title Company of Utah and were delivered by Guardian to Krantz, 
who then delivered those documents to an attorney for Wycalis. 
(R. 495.) 
14. R & C Associates and Roy Miller, its general partner, 
have filed in bankruptcy. (R. 495 * 496.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Krantz and Christenson are parties to the contract 
evidenced by the promissory note and trust deed and Guardian 
Title Company is, therefore, the agent of Krantz and 
Christenson. By reason of the agency relationship between 
Krantz and Christenson and Guardian Title Company, Krantz and 
Christenson are bound by the acts of Guardian which resulted in 
the loss of the security. Therefore, the one action rule is 
not applicable because the loss of the security was not the 
fault of Wycalis, and Wycalis is entitled to judgment against 
Krantz and Christenson for the amount due and owing on the 
note, including interest, costs, and attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS KRANTZ AND CHRISTENSON ARE PARTIES TO THE 
CONTRACT EVIDENCED BY THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND TRUST DEED 
6 
Krantz and Christenson urge that the district court erred 
in determining that the trustee under the subject deed of trust 
was the agent for Krantz and Christenson. (Krantz and 
Christenson brief pages 6*11.) It is clear however, that the 
district court did not err in this regard. This is shown by 
the facts of this case and applicable case law. 
It is undisputed that Krantz and Christenson are co4makers 
on the promissory note. (R. 493, plaintiff's exhibit 1.) 
Although it is true that Krantz and Chrijstenson were not 
trustors of the deed of trust, the presence of their signatures 
on the promissory note is sufficient to establish Krantz and 
Christenson as parties to the contract evidenced by the note 
and the trust deed. This is so for three reasons. First, as 
noted, it is undisputed that Krantz and Christenson signed the 
promissory note. Second, it is also undisputed that the note 
was secured by the deed of trust (plaintiff's exhibit 1) and 
that the trust deed was executed for th^ purpose of securing 
payment of the note. (Plaintiff's exhibit 2.) Third, it is 
established Utah law that although a promissory note which is 
secured by a mortgage and the mortgage may be separate 
documents, they are not separate contracts. (American Savings 
and Loan Association v. Bloomquist, 445 P.2d 1, Utah 1968.) 
This holding in American Savings is a special application 
of the general rule of contracts which provides that where two 
or more instruments are executed by the same parties at or near 
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the same time, in the course of the same transaction, 
concerning the same subject matter, they will be read and 
construed together. (Bullfrog Marina Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 
266 at 270 * 271, Utah 1972.) In Bullfrog, plaintiff, a 
corporation, was a concessionaire of the National Park Service 
and had the exclusive right to operate tourist facilities at 
Bullfrog basin on Lake Powell, San Juan County, Utah. 
Plaintiff and defendant executed a lease agreement and an 
employment agreement. Defendant was employed by plaintiff to 
operate a house boat rental service. The lease provided that 
defendant was to lease to Bullfrog Marina Inc. three houseboats 
for a period of two years. The issue on appeal was whether the 
trial court erred in the holding that the lease and the 
employment contract were an integration. In affirming the 
trial court's determination that the lease and employment 
agreement were an integration, this court stated: 
The trial court did not err in following the rule of 
law that where two or more instruments are executed by the 
same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in 
the course of the same transaction, and concern the same 
subject matter, they will be read and construed together so 
far as determining the respective rights and interests of 
the parties, although they do not in terms refer to each 
other. (Id. at 271, emphasis added.) 
In American Savings, supra, the court held that this rule 
of integration of contracts was applicable to an acceleration 
provision in a mortgage securing a note. American Savings 
commenced an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage on the 
residence of defendants. At trial, the court found that there 
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were no issues of fact to be submitted to the jury and rendered 
a judgment of foreclosure for plaintiff. Defendants1 appealed 
urging that the trial court erred in ruling that the debt 
evidenced by the note was properly accelerated under the terms 
of the mortgage. This court affirmed the trial court's ruling 
by stating: 
Under the majority rule, an acceleration provision of 
a mortgage securing a note enters into and becomes a part 
of the note, so that the maturity of the note is advanced 
in like manner with the maturity of the mortgage. The 
courts proceed on the theory that the note and rortgage, 
though separate instruments, are not separate contracts, 
but, being executed at the same time and in the course of 
the same transaction, constituted a single contract. 
(American Savings and Loan Association v. Bloomguist, at 3 
* 4. ) 
That Krantz and Christenson are parties to the contract 
evidenced by the note and trust deed is unrefutable in view of 
these authorities and particularly in view of the Bullfrog 
decision. In Bullfrog this court held the contracts integrated 
even though neither document made reference to the other. In 
the instant case, both the note and the trust deed clearly 
reference each other. The note specifically provides that the 
"... note and the interest thereon is secured by a Second Trust 
Deed dated June 26, 1980, on property located in Weber County, 
Utah." (Plaintiff's exhibit 1.) Reciprocally, the trust deed 
provides that the trust deed is executed "... FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF SECURING PAYMENT of the indebtedness evidenced by a 
promissory note of even date herewith..4." 
Clearly, if documents, as in Bullfrog, which make no 
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reference to each other are an integration, the note and trust 
deed in this case, which were executed at or near the same 
time, by the same parties, in the course of the same 
transaction, concerning the same subject matter, and which 
clearly reference each other must be construed as a single 
contract. 
POINT II 
THE CONTRACT GIVES RISE TO AN AGENCY BETWEEN 
KRANTZ AND CHRISTENSON AND THE TRUSTEE 
Krantz and Christenson urge that the district court erred 
in holding that Krantz and Christenson were the principals of 
the trustee. (Krantz and Christenson' brief page 6.) In 
support of this contention Krantz and Christenson argue that 
they were not parties to the trust deed and that there is no 
contractual basis for the finding of agency. (Krantz and 
Christenson1 brief, page 7.) As discussed in point I above, 
there is ample authority for the conclusion that Krantz and 
Christenson were parties to the contract evidenced by the 
promissory note and deed of trust. 
Since Krantz and Christenson were parties to the contract, 
the question is whether the contract gives rise to an agency 
relationship between Krantz and Christenson and Guardian, the 
trustee. Review of applicable authorities answers this 
question in the affirmative. Section 15 of the Restatement 
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(2nd) of Agency provides as follows: 
Manifestations of Consent 
An agency relation exists only if there is a 
manifestation by the principal to the agent that the agent 
may act on his account, and consent by the agent so to act. 
In this case, the two requirements for an agency are 
satisfied. The manifestation by Krantz and Christenson to the 
trustee that the trustee was authorized to act on Krantz and 
Christenson's behalf appears in the contlract evidenced by the 
note and trust deed. The promissory note clearly references 
the trust deed (and visa versa) and the trust deed provides 
that the property was conveyed to Guardian as trustee for the 
purpose of securing the promissory note., (Plaintiff's exhibit. 
2.) Further, under Utah trust deed statute, the trustee has 
the power to reconvey (§574H33), the exercise of which, 
resulted in damage to Wycalis. Since the terms of the contract 
provide for appointment of Guardian as trustee, and since the 
Krantz and Christenson are parties to that contract, adequate 
evidence exists showing a manifestation by Krantz and 
Christenson that Guardian was empowered to act as agent and 
trustee on Krantz and Christenson's behalf. 
The second requirement of agency is satisfied because 
Guardian consented to act as agent for krantz and Christenson. 
This is shown by two facts. First, the trust deed and 
promissory note were prepared by Guardian and delivered to 
appellant Krantz, who then delivered th^ documents to Wycalis' 
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attorney. (R. 495.) Secondly, as shown by the recording 
information on the trust deed, the trust deed was recorded at 
the request of Guardian Title. (plaintiff's exhibit 2.) 
It is clear from the trust deed and the promissory note 
that Krantz and Christenson consented to Guardian's acting as 
their agent and that Guardian agreed to act in this capacity, 
thus establishing an agency between the parties. 
POINT III 
KRANTZ AND CHRISTENSON HAVE AN INTEREST 
IN THE SECURITY 
The district court held that Krantz and Christenson had an 
interest in the security. (R. 539.) This conclusion is not in 
error for two reasons. First, as found by the district court, 
Krantz and Christenson paid a consideration for the use of the 
security and therefor had an interest in the same. (R. 539.) 
Second, that Krantz and Christenson have an interest in the 
security is confirmed by Krantz- and Christenson in their 
assertion that they are entitled to the protection from 
judgment afforded by the one action or security first rule. 
(Krantz and Christenson brief page 11 313.) 
The one action rule (§78*37*1) provides as follows: 
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt 
or the enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage 
upon real estate which action must be in accordance with 
the provisions of this chapter. 
The one action rule has been held applicable to deeds of trust 
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in Utah. (Salt Lake Valley Loan and Trust Company v. 
Millspaugh, et al., 54 P. 892, Utah 1898.) It is also the rule 
that where property is given in trust as security for payment 
of a note, the security must first be exhausted before other 
property can be resorted to for payment of the debt. This 
principal was recently affirmed in Bawden and Associates v. 
Smith, 646 P.2d 711 (Utah, 1982). It is the application of 
this aspect of the security first rule which Krantz and 
Christenson claim to be entitled. (Appellant's brief page 11, 
13.) 
It is Krantz and Christenson's argument that, since 
Wycalis' agent Gu-ardian Title lost the security, and since, as 
argued, Guardian was not Krantz and Chrijstenson's agent, Krantz 
and Christenson are protected from judgment since Wycalis1 
agent released the security and Wycalis is bound by the acts of 
her agent. (Krantz and Christensonfs brief page 11-<13.) 
Having already addressed the agency question; and reserving the 
question of whether Krantz and Christenson are entitled to the 
protection of the one action rule for later discussion (Point V 
below), attention is directed to the assertion by Krantz and 
Christenson that they have standing to claim protection under 
the one action rule and the implication that assertion has upon 
the issue of whether Krantz and Christenson have an interest in 
the security. 
It should be apparent that if Krantz and Christenson have 
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standing to assert protection of the security first rule, that 
the rights giving rise to that standing must have originated in 
the contact between the debtors, the creditor and the trustee. 
As previously discussed, this court held in Bullfrog that where 
two or more documents are executed by the same parties, at or 
near the same time, in the course of the same transaction, and 
pertaining to the same subject matter, the documents will be 
construed together "so far as determining the respective rights 
and interests of the parties". (Bullfrog at 271.) Here, 
Krantz and Christenson, obligors under the contract, seek to 
enforce the security first rule against Wycalis, obligee under 
the same contract-. Any standing to assert the rule must 
therefore rise by reason of Krantz and Christenson's status as 
debtors of a secured obligation. Therefore, Krantz and 
Christenson have an interest in the security without which they 
would not have standing to assert the security first rule. 
POINT IV 
KRANTZ AND CHRISTENSON'S INTEREST IN THE SECURITY 
IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE AGENCY 
It is established that Krantz and Christenson have an 
interest in the security. As a consequence, it follows that 
the trustee is the agent of Krantz and Christenson. This is so 
because as co4makers who have an interest in the security, 
Krantz and Christenson derive a benefit as required by 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §14. (Krantz and Christenson 
brief page 7.) Krantz and Christenson derive a benefit from 
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the security because the security enabled them to purchase 
property from Wycalis. Further benefit is derived from the 
security because, had their agent not released the security, 
they would be entitled to the protection afforded by the 
security first rule. Clearly, Krantz and Christenson derived a 
benefit from their interest in the security. 
Krantz and Christenson assert, however, that no agency can 
exist because the second requirement of an agency, that of 
control, is absent. In support of this contention, Krantz and 
Christenson refer to several statutory provisions which 
identify powers of, or control by, the beneficiary. (Krantz 
and Christenson brief page 8.) These provisions, however, show 
only the presence of control by a beneficiary and do not 
evidence an absence of control on the part of Krantz and 
Christenson. More importantly, however, is the fact that even 
if there is an absence of control on the part of Krantz and 
Christenson, that absence of control is a consequence of the 
terms and conditions of the contract; a contract which was 
negotiated, bargained for, and freely entered by Krantz and 
Christenson. A contract which is clear upon its face that 
Krantz and Christenson were debtors to Wycalis, that the 
security for the debt was provided by R & C Associates, and 
where the clear and unequivocal terms of the contract state 
that the security was to be held in trust and Guardian was to 
act as trustee. The contract was bargained for and freely 
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entered by Krantz and Christenson, it is their contract, they 
negotiated its terms and they are bound by the same. 
Further, it is Utah law that in determining the respective 
rights of the parties to an integration, that courts will look 
to all documents evidencing the contract. (Bullfrog, supra, at 
271.) Here the terms of the contact provide that Krantz and 
Christenson are debtors and that Guardian was the trustee. 
This court has approved language which states that "a trustee 
named in a deed of trust to secure a loan sustains a fiduciary 
relation to the debtor as well as the creditor . ..." (Blodgett 
v. Marstch, 590 P.2d 298 at 302, citing Spruill v. Ballard, 61 
App.D.C. 112, 58 F.2d 517, 1932.) In accordance with this 
language and by reason of the terms of the contract as well as 
by reason of Krantz and Christenson's interest in the security, 
Guardian Title, trustee, is the fiduciary of Krantz and 
Christenson. 
POINT V 
KRANTZ AND CHRISTENSON ARE BOUND BY THE ACTS OF 
THEIR AGENT, WHOSE ACTS RENDERED THE SECURITY 
FIRST RULE INAPPLICABLE 
Krantz and Christenson are bound by the acts of their 
agent. It is a fundamental principal of agency recognized in 
Utah law that a principal is bound by, and is liable for, an 
act which the agent does with or within the actual or apparent 
authority. (Forsyth v. Pendalton, 617 P.2d 358, Utah 1980; 
16 
Wells v. Walker Bank and Trust Company, 590 P.2d 1261, Utah 
1979; Jones v. Mutual Creamry Company, 17, P.2d 256, Utah 1932.) 
As previously indicated, the one action rule has been held 
applicable to deeds of trust in Utah. (gait Lake Valley Loan 
and Trust Company, supra.) As also stated, it is the rule that 
where property is given in trust as security for payment of the 
note, the security must first be exhausted before other 
property of the debtor can be resorted to for payment of the 
debt. (Bawden and Associates v. Smith, supra.) However, an 
exception to this rule requiring the exhaustion of the security 
exists where the the security has been lost through no fault of 
the mortgagee. A« was stated in Cache Valley Banking v. Logan 
Lodge #1453, BPQE, 56 P.2d 1046, Utah 1936. 
It is true that in this state there can be but one 
action upon the debt secured by a mortgage and that the 
personal liability of the mortgagor cannot be enforced 
until the security has been exhausted (National Bank of 
Commerce v. James Pingree Company, 2|18 P 552, Utah 1923), 
but it has also been held that, where the security has been 
lost through no fault of the mortgagee, an action may be 
maintained directly upon the personal obligation evidenced 
by the note without going through the idle and fruitless 
procedure of foreclosure (Donaldson v. Grant, 49 P. 779, 
Utah 1897) . (Id. at 1049. ) 
In Cache Valley Banking Company plaintiff sued to recover a 
promissory note secured by a trust deed in second position 
behind a trust deed in favor of Beneficial Life Insurance 
Company. The Beneficial Life trust deed had been foreclosed 
prior to the commencement of the action on the promissory 
note. By reason of this foreclosure, plaintiff was divested of 
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all right, title, claim, lien and demand against the premises 
and the security of defendants1 second mortgage was entirely 
exhausted, leaving the note unsecured. In quoting the 
California Supreme Court in Savings Bank v. Central Market 
Company, 122 Cal. 28, 54 P. 273, 276 (1898), the Utah court 
stated: 
I know of no rule of law or equity which requires the 
second mortgagee to bring suit to recover his debt when the 
first mortgagee saw fit to do so. It is apparent that had 
he foreclosed, he would have received nothing. I cannot 
conceive upon what theory the mortgagor, or any other 
payors, can complain that he did not do so. Plaintiff no 
longer has a lien upon the property, and his debt is not 
now secured by a mortgage. He did not voluntarily release 
his security. He has not waived nor lost it by his 
negligence .... (Cache Valley Banking Company at 1049.) 
Similarly, the trial court found that Wycalis' security was 
lost through no fault of her own.
 9 (R. 540, 545.) The trustee 
of Wycalis1 trust deed executed and recorded a deed of 
reconveyance which was not authorized by Wycalis. (R. 538, 
544.) Upon the recordation of the deed of reconveyance, 
Wycalis was divested of her security interest. (R. 539, 544.) 
Wycalis did not voluntarily release her security and did not 
lose it by way of her own negligence. (R. 540, 545.) It was 
lost by the wrongful reconveyance executed by the trustee. (R. 
538, 544.) 
As in Cache Valley Banking Company in which the court held 
that foreclosure of the first trust deed did not precluded 
plaintiff from bringing an action on the note, the wrongful 
reconveyance and resulting loss of plaintiff's security does 
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not preclude her from bringing an action on the debt. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in entering judgment 
against Krantz and Christenson for the amount due and owing on 
the debt. This is so because Guardian was clearly acting 
within its authority when it reconveyed Wycalis1 security 
interest. Because Guardian is the agent of Krantz and 
Christenson as well as Wycalis, Krantz and Christenson are 
bound by the trustee's acts and are not excused from 
performance on the promissory note. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in entering 
judgment against Krantz and Christenson for the amount due and 
owing on the debt. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err in granting judgment against 
defendants Krantz and Christenson. Krantz and Christenson are 
makers on a promissory note secured by a trust deed. The agent 
of Wycalis, who was also the agent of Krantz and Christenson, 
wrongfully reconveyed the trust property and therefore the 
security was exhausted through no fault of Wycalis. Wycalis is 
entitled to judgment against Krantz and Christenson as makers 
of the note . /^ 7 
5 ^ — / 
Dated: /nijuftt /& , 1986. 
SHERMAN C. YOU^G 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this /{)k 
caused to be mailed a true and correct 
brief of appellant to the following: 
day 
copy 
Vf/Augunt, 1 
of the 
986, I 
foregoing 
Joseph E. Hatch 
Attorney at Law 
311 South State 
Salt Lake City, 
Eric P. Hartman 
Attorney at Law 
2120 South 1300 
Salt Lake City, 
Street #320 
UT 84101 
East #301 
UT 84106 
David R. Money 
George w. Pratt 
Attorneys at Law 
1500 1st Interstate Plaza 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
SHERMAN C. 
20 
A D D E N D U M 
Promissory note dated July 1, 1980 
Second trust deed dated June 26, 1980 
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• 6JL,.8.CLQ.*..Q.Q 
INSTALLMENT PROMISSORY M/TE 
Juiy.^1
 19 80 
For value received, I, we, or either of us, promise to pay to the order of ..^BETTEMVreCALISM.and. 
EVA ROBERTSON 
at ....3.Q8...Npr.th....40.0..East < .Pay.son, U t *
 t the sum of 
SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS 
together with interest on the unpaid balance thereof from date at the rate of A9.:J?.* percent per 
annum, in lawful money of the United States, in monthly installments of t 7.56....5.2 each on the 
... l .s . t day of each and every month beginning with the ..._?.?: day of _ . ? . ^ . ! r 
19..8.CL , and continuing until the whole thereof shall have been fully paid. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers of this note jointly and severally agree that if any installment is not 
paid when due, that the whole of the principal sum then remaining unpaid, together with the accrued interest thereon 
shall forthwith become due and payable at the option of the holder of this note, and that beginning with the date of such 
default the whole of said unpaid principal shall bear interest at the rate of >&percent per annum both, before and 
after judgment. 1 0 . 5 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally consent to renewals and extensions at or after ma-
turity hereof and waive presentment for payment, notice of dishonor, protest and notice thereof, and agree to pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee, together with all costs and expenses incurred* in the event that this note is placed in the 
hands of any attorney for collection. R & Cy*V8SOCIATES , 
Address 
Address ...95.4 .KaJLden..H.;U.ls...D.i;ily.e.., 2. ... 
SLC, UTAH 
Address 
Address 
Price, Utah 84501 n E% ^TnTCJ?^ 
<• 4EO^L&&SMW^-
the interest thereon is secured by a Second*Trust Deea dated his note and ... ...r .. .___ 
1 property 1Ocated ln Weber County.Utah. 
June 26, 1980 
I 
0 
I 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: RUTH S ^ >fcN 
JL#iAyJil|tlliWH'M OEPUi - $ W * ^ d l ^ 
JUL 15 I I 2 5 AM fB0 
Space Above for Jlecorderfe.Daeu riujhtjD f Qfr 
%rusi pttb 
PLATTED • VERIFIED 
ENTERED Q MICROFILMED 
THIS TRUST DEED is made this 26th day of June ,19 80 , 
between R & C ASSOCIATES, a general partnership , as Trustor, 
whose address is Bountiful Utah 
(Street and Number) (City) (State) 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH , as Trustee,* and 
BETTE WYCALIS and EVA ROBERTSON . fls Beneficiary. 
Trustor hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER 
OF SALE, the following described property situated in Weber County, Utah: 
Beginning at a point which lies South 0°28*07n West 949.73 feet 
and North 89031'16M East 50.01 feet of the Northwest Corner of 
the Southwest Quarter of Section 12, Township 5 North, Range 2 
West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°33,00" 
East 247.36 feet to the Weber-Davis Canal; thence South 21°03,35" 
West along said canal 106.85 feet; thence South 89°33,00M West 
209.78 feet to the East Right-of-Way line of 1900 West Street; 
thence North 0°28,07" East along said Right-of-Way line 99.42 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, 
easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory 
note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ 61,800.00 , payable to the order of 
Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and payment of any 
sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the security hereof. 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the above property, to pay all charges and 
assessments on water or water stock used on or with said property, not to commit waste, to maintain 
adequate fire insurance on improvements on said property, to pay all costs and expenses of collec-
tion (including Trustee's and attorney's fees in event of default in payment of the indebtedness se-
cured hereby) and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services performed by Trustee 
hereunder, including a reconveyance hereof. 
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
..R..A.C.AS^IATESJ^ 
Mi "J^r^^J^K.. 
Roy L .Kf l l e r general partner 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF Salt Lake 
On the 26th day of June , 19 80
 t personally appeared before me 
ROY L. MILLER who being duly sworn did say that he is a general partner of R & C 
ASSOCIATES, a general partnership and that said instrument was siqned in behalf of 
said partnership by authority, and said ROY L. MILLER acknowledged to me that he as 
such.^enferal jpbtfper executed the same in the name of the partnership. 
3 
^ / Notary Public ' 
My Commission Expires: June 28, 1981 Residing at: Kaysvi l le , Utah 
•NOTE: Trustee must be a member of the Utah Stale Bar, a bank, building and loan association or wavinjjs and 
loan association authorized to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah; or • title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah. 
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